The aim of this study is to assess whether fuel prices in Greece respond asymmetrically to changes in the global oil prices. To do so, we depart from the current practice in the literature that focuses on fuel prices. Rather, we consider the mark-up of both the refineries and retailers. Even more, unlike the bulk of the existing literature, we take into consideration the whole supply chain, i.e. both the refineries and the retail fuel sector. Hence, we first assess whether the refineries' mark-up responds asymmetrically to the global oil prices and subsequently whether the retailers' mark-up shows an asymmetric behaviour relatively to changes in the refineries' fuel prices. Our findings show that the Greek fuel retailers do not change their mark-up behaviour based on changes of the refined fuel price. By contrast, the asymmetric behaviour is evident in the refineries mark-up relatively to changes in the global oil prices, which is then passed through to the retailers and consumers. Finally, we convincingly show that weekly and monthly data mask any such asymmetric relationship. Thus, we maintain that unless the appropriate data frequency, fuel price transformations and the whole supply chain are considered, misleading findings could be revealed.
Introduction
Global oil prices have experienced huge swings since 2007, when they fluctuated from about $60 per barrel to a record high of $145 in 2008 and subsequently dropped sharply at about $30 in late 2008, or even during the period 2014-2015, when oil lost about 75% of its price. Recently, during 2016 to 2019, oil prices experienced another period of abrupt change rising from about $30 (January 2016) to $78 (September 2018), then dropping back to the levels of $50 in December 2018 before they bounce back to almost $70 in April 2019.
Furthermore, over the last decade or so we have observed the increased financialisation of the oil market, which, in many cases, has driven oil prices away from their fundamentals. Such developments certainly affect the pricing strategies of oil companies and although this should primarily affect the upstream oil sector, given their large fixed costs. Nevertheless, similar observations have been extensively reported for the downstream sector, as well.
Indeed, there is a wealth of literature that assesses the effects of global oil price fluctuations on the pump price and whether the response of the latter is asymmetric towards increases and decreases of the former (some recent studies include Valadkhani et al., 2015; Rahman, 2016; Apergis and Vouzavalis, 2018; Eleftheriou et al. 2018; Kang et al., 2018) . This asymmetric behaviour has been characterised by a term coined by Bacon (1991) called rockets and feathers. The rockets and feathers phenomenon suggests that when crude oil prices increase then there is an immediate increase in pump fuel prices; whereas during crude oil prices decreases, pump prices tend to adjust at a much slower pace. Perdiguero-García (2013) , Kristoufek and Lunackova (2015) and more recently Cook and Fosten (2018) provide an extensive review of this line of research. On the whole, the existing evidence demonstrates several interesting regularities.
First, the reported findings do not reach a consensus since there are studies that find evidence in favour of the asymmetric behaviour (see for instance, Duffy-Deno, 1996; Balke et al., 1998; Grasso and Manera, 2007; Blair et al., 2017) , whereas other studies cannot provide any support to such claims (Shin, 1994; Godby et al., 2000; Balaguer and Ripollés, 2012; Karagiannis et al., 2015) .
Second, studies concentrate their attention to the effects of oil prices on the pump prices, largely ignoring the effects of the former on the refining industry (see for instance, Manning, 1991; Borenstein et al., 1997; Godby et al., 2000; Meyler, 2009; Rahman, 2016; Apergis and Vouzavalis, 2018) . Delpachitra (2002) is one of scarce studies that shows that price adjustments in the domestic market do not respond effectively to changes in the international oil prices. By contrast, they report that domestic wholesale prices are the key to determining retail prices. Thus, the lack of competition in the wholesale market was found to be the main cause of the weak adjustment of retail prices. Galeotti, et al. (2003) and Kaufmann and Laskowski (2005) also focus on the refining industry, although they reach to different conclusions. The former study focuses on five European countries (Germany, Spain, France, Italy and the UK) and show that asymmetric behaviour is evident in both the refining and distribution stages. By contrast, Kaufmann and Laskowski (2005) study the US market and they show that the refining margin does not exhibit any asymmetric behaviour towards changes in the crude oil prices. More recently, Balaguer and Ripollés (2012) find evidence in favour of a symmetric behaviour of retail fuel prices to changes in the wholesale prices.
Third, the most common data frequency that is considered by the existing literature is either weekly or monthly (e.g. Kirchgässner and Kübler, 1992; Shin, 1994; Duffy-Deno, 1996 , Godby et al., 2000 Bermingham and O'Brien, 2011) . Authors have almost ignored the potential effects at daily frequency with some exception to include the studies by Bachmeier and Griffin (2003) , Oladunjoye (2008) and recently Gautier and Saout (2015) and Lahiani et al. (2017) .
Forth, studies in this line of research most commonly employ methods such as the error correction model (or variants of this model) and panel regressions (see, Manning, 1991; Balke et al., 1998; Bettendorf et al., 2003; Grasso and Manera, 2007; Panagiotidis and Rutledge, 2007; Douglas, 2010; Balaguer and Ripollés, 2016, among others) .
Turning our attention to the Greek downstream oil sectors, the existing findings are rather inconclusive, as well. On one hand, Angelopoulou and Gibson (2010) study the aforementioned relationship focusing on the different prefectures of the Greek region and do not support the view that pump prices asymmetrically respond to positive and negative changes in the crude oil prices. They further suggest that any observed asymmetry is due to the tax changes. Similar results are also provided by a recent study of Apergis and Vouzavalis (2018) , who report a symmetric pass-through of crude oil prices to retail pump prices.
By contrast, Polemis (2012) maintains that the reactions of the retail fuel prices to wholesale price decreases and increases are asymmetric. Polemis (2012) also studies the potential asymmetric responses of the wholesale prices to crude oil prices changes, yet he did not find evidence in favour of such asymmetry. The findings by Bragoudakis and Sideris (2012), regarding the retail sector, corroborate those of Polemis (2012) . Table 1 provides a summary of some selected studies.
[TABLE 1 HERE]
It is rather evident from the brief overview of the related literature that there are certain gaps in this line of research, which are considered in this study. First, we are among the very few studies that concentrate on the whole supply chain from the global oil prices to the pump prices so to identify where there might be any asymmetric behaviour. Second, we consider three different data frequencies (daily, weekly and monthly) in order to assess whether lower frequencies mask any asymmetries.
More importantly, though, we depart from the current practice in the literature that centres its attention on fuel prices. Rather, our focus is on the refineries' and retailers' mark-ups rather than refine and fuel prices. We do so since refine and fuel prices may not necessarily reveal the pricing strategy of both refineries and retailers.
However, the asymmetric behaviour is expected to be impacted by the mark-up that refineries or retailers will charge on top of the purchase price of fuel. For instance, there could be cases where fuel prices may not change due to declines in global oil prices; however, this could be due to changes in taxation, while the mark-up remains constant.
Hence, in such case, the identification of the asymmetric behaviour would be inappropriately identified. Thus, it is important to assess first whether the refineries' mark-up responds asymmetrically to the global oil prices and subsequently whether the retailers' mark-up shows an asymmetric behaviour relatively to changes in the refineries' fuel prices. Brown and Yücel (2000) have claimed that the observed asymmetry in the pump prices could be sourced to the changing profit margins (i.e. mark-ups) of retailers, although they did not formally test this claim in the same fashion as we do in the present study.
Against this backdrop, the aim of this paper is to investigate the impact of the global crude oil prices on the Greek refining, as well as, the retail (petrol stations) sectors. In particular, we investigate the impact of global oil price fluctuations on the refineries and retailers, focusing primarily on the unleaded 95 fuel, which is the most traded fuel in Greece.
Succinctly put, our findings show that the Greek fuel retailers do not change their mark-up behaviour based on changes of the refined fuel price. By contrast, the asymmetric behaviour is evident in the refineries mark-up relatively to changes in the global oil prices, which is then passed through to the retailers and consumers. Worth noting is the evidence that weekly and monthly data do mask the asymmetric relationship. Also, we convincingly present that, unless the appropriate fuel prices are considered, we may reveal misleading findings.
The structure of the remaining report is as follows. Section 2 presents the data and methods used in this study, while Section 3 discusses the empirical findings. Finally, Section 4 concludes the study.
Data and methods

Data description
As shown in Section 1 and Table 1 , previous studies mainly consider weekly or monthly data, employ error correction models and focus on pump prices. We depart from these standard approaches, considering daily data, employing a short-run model and focusing on the mark-ups of refineries and retailers, rather than on fuel prices. We maintain that in order to assess any asymmetric behaviour in fuel prices it should be performed based on the core profitability ratio. In this study we use both the retailers' mark-up in pre-and post-tax fuel prices. Furthermore, we maintain that weekly and, more importantly, monthly data may mask any asymmetric relationship, given that such price behaviour should not be expected to hold for lengthy time periods.
For the purpose of the current study, we use PLATTS price (as a proxy of import prices given that the cost of imported crude oil (CIF) prices were not available at daily frequency), refine prices, final pump prices for the unleaded 95, as well as, the total tax imposed on the fuel prices. The data have been obtained from the Greek Ministry of Economy and Development and the period of study is from the 7 th January 2014 until 10 th April 2018 (1267 daily observations). The data period is dictated by the data availability of the daily data. Table 2 and Figure 1 present the descriptive statistics of the data and their visual representation, respectively.
[TABLE 2 HERE] [FIGURE 1 HERE]
From Table 2 it is evident the very high proportion of taxes to the retail fuel price, which, on average, is about 65.5%. Another interesting observation from Table   2 is the fact that the variation in retail prices and retail mark-ups are materially lower compared to the refine prices and refineries mark-up, respectively. This is rather interesting, suggesting that the refineries are engaging in a more dynamic pricing strategy, which possibly this is something that petrol stations cannot follow. Figure 1 also confirms the high contribution of taxes in the final retail fuel prices.
Methods
Modelling Retailers' mark-up
We denote !" # where, 78 # , 7 # , 9: # , and 9; # , presenting the daily retail profit, refine price, fixed taxation and variable taxation, respectively. The 78 # = <7 # − 7 # + 9: # + 9; # , with <7 # denoting the after-tax retail fuel price.
We proceed to the estimation of the most recent trading days that the retailers buy oil. The retailers buy oil at irregular days depending of the demand for fuel from the end users and the prices offered by the refiners. Hence, we estimate the average refine price of the K most recent trading days that maximize the coefficient of determination for the relation between the deviations of the refine prices and retailers' mark-up. Hence, we seek to estimate
(1) for the regression:
where " U (%&#_#-.) denotes the average retailers' mark-up including the taxation effect on the final fuel price. Z {\ U 2 ]\ U 2^M } denotes an indicator factor of the form
Naturally, we proceed with a numerical solution of the max B (. ), as analytical solution is not available. The optimum number of the most recent trading days is f = 10 for max B (. ) = 33.9% (see Figure 2 ).
[FIGURE 2 HERE]
Hence, we infer that overall retailers purchase prices and subsequently their mark-up is shaping up from the refine prices of the ten most recent trading days. Based on the above, the estimated model is:
where
Coefficient Given our interest to assess the effect of taxation on the abovementioned relationship, we further estimate the following regression:
where, " U (%&#) denotes the average retailers' mark-up on the pre-tax fuel prices and Z {\ U 2 ]\ 2^M } presents an indicator variable, as previously.
Results and discussion
(A)symmetric behaviour of retailers to oil price changes
Following the bulk of the literature presented in Section 1, we start our analysis by investigating the existence of asymmetric behaviour of retail prices to changes in global oil prices. The results for the retailers' mark-up, including and excluding the effect of taxation, are presented in Tables 3 and 4.   [TABLE 3 and 4 HERE] Both tables provide the same findings, i.e. that retailers seem to follow a different pricing strategy depending on whether the 10-days moving average PLATTS prices are increasing or decreasing. In particular, irrespectively of the effect of taxation, the indicator factor is highly significant in both the constant and the slope. The positive and significant values of n * and t * coefficients suggest that when the average PLATTS prices are decreasing, the average retail prices are higher (i.e. n Y < n Y + n * and t Y < t Y + t * ).
Turning our attention to the slope, we observe that coefficients n o , n q , t o and These results clearly suggest that there is an asymmetric behaviour in the pricing strategy of retailers; where during low PLATTS price levels they tend to increase their mark-up significantly more compared to the higher PLATTS price levels. Our results corroborate those of the existing literature, as discussed in Section 1.
However, we need to make an important observation here. Retailers in Greece do not buy their fuel from the global oil market. Rather, they purchase their fuel from the refineries, hence the behaviour of their mark-up should be assessed based on the fluctuations of the refineries' fuel prices rather than the global oil prices (PLATTS).
So next, we re-estimate our models based on the retailers' mark-up as a percentage of the refined fuel prices.
Based on the above, the estimated model, without the taxation effect, is: 
The Z {0+ UUUU 2 ]0+ UUUU 2^M } presents an indicator variable: The results are shown in Tables 5 and 6 .
[ It is rather interesting that when we generate estimates based on the appropriate fuel prices (i.e., refineries fuel prices rather than global oil prices), the retailers' asymmetric behaviour disappears, regardless the incorporate or exclusion of the taxation effect. This is an important finding, as we convincingly show that unless the appropriate fuel prices are considered in this line of enquiry, we may reveal misleading findings.
A reasonable question that follows is where the observed asymmetric behaviour may rest, if not with the retailers. Possibly, this asymmetry is evident at another stage of the supply chain. Hence, in the following section we test whether the asymmetric behaviour can be traced to the refineries.
(A)symmetric behaviour of refineries to oil price changes
To model refineries' behaviour, let us denote as !" # (%&5) ( #)* + the daily refineries' mark-up, for " # (%&5) = 0 2 T\ 2 \ 2 , where 7 # and < # denote the daily refine and platts prices, respectively.
As in the case of retailers, refineries also buy oil at irregular days depending on the required amount and the offered prices. Hence, we estimate the average PLATTS price of the K most recent trading days that maximize the coefficient of determination for the relationship between the deviations of the PLATTS prices and refineries' markup. Hence, we seek for
for the regression:
where Companies Association (HPMCA). The estimated model is:
where Z {\ U 2 ]\ U 2^M } presents the indicator variable:
The results for the refineries are shown in These results clearly suggest that there is an asymmetric behaviour in the pricing strategy of refineries; where during decreasing PLATTS price levels they tend to increase their mark-up significantly more compared to the increasing PLATTS price levels.
[ Figure 4 we depict the symmetric behaviour between the refineries' mark-up and the PLATTS price changes. It is evident that there is a negative relationship, yet we cannot clearly distinguish whether this relationship has a different behaviour during decreasing and increasing PLATTS price levels. The latter is exhibited in Figure 5 . It is rather clear that the slope in the lower panel of Figure 5 (which is the decreasing PLATTS price levels)
is steeper compared to the slope in the upper panel. Even more, the refineries' mark-up levels are also higher in the lower panel (see y-axes).
[FIGURES 4 and 5 HERE]
Robustness tests
For robustness and comparative purpose we run the same models using weekly and monthly data, which are the most common data sampling frequencies used by the existing studies. The results are shown in Table 8 . We have estimated the models for the refineries only, since this is where we have identified the asymmetric behavior. We estimate the model in equation 10 at both weekly and monthly frequencies. For additional robustness, we convert the daily data into weekly and monthly using both the last daily observation of the week or month, as well as, the average daily prices of the week or month.
[ The results clearly show that the evidence of asymmetric behaviour disappears when we use the data at a lower sampling frequency, although some asymmetry can be observed in the slope of the regression model for the weekly data (see { * coefficient).
Therefore, our findings clearly suggest that using lower sampling frequencies (i.e. lower than daily), which is rather common in the existing literature, is not the adequate approach to identify the possible asymmetries.
Concluding remarks
The aim of this paper is to assess the potential asymmetric behaviour of the
Greek refineries and fuel retailers on increasing and decreasing global oil prices. Unlike the bulk of the existing literature, we consider the whole supply chain in order to discover as to whether such asymmetric behaviour exists. Even more, we depart from the practice of the existing literature that focuses on the actual fuel prices, but rather we focus on the refineries' and retailers' mark-ups based on the premise that any asymmetric behaviour should be evident in the pricing strategy of these two stakeholders.
Overall, our findings based on daily data show that the fuel retailers do not change their mark-up behaviour based on increasing or decreasing refined fuel price.
By contrast, refineries' mark-up changes relatively to changes in the global oil prices, which is suggestive of an asymmetric behaviour that is then passed through to the retailers and consumers. We further highlight that the use of weekly and monthly data mask this asymmetric relationship. Also, we convincingly show that unless the appropriate fuel price transformation is considered (i.e. mark-ups), we may reveal misleading findings.
Our results certainly provide new insights in the investigation of the global oil price effects on refine and retail prices. The main implication of these findings is that
Greek authorities may want to investigate the sources of such asymmetric behaviour in the refining industry and the possibility that it exercises monopolistic power over the refine price. If such a case is true, antitrust policies may need to be formulated.
Further research could investigate the main drivers of the asymmetric behaviour of refineries mark-up to changes in global oil prices so to identify whether such behaviour is led by speculation, collusive behaviour or due to the cost structure of refineries. Another interesting avenue for further study could constitute the identification of asymmetric behaviour based on a time-varying framework. Finally, similar econometric frameworks should be employed to additional countries since the potential asymmetric behaviour by refineries or retailers is a global issue. Observations 1267 1267 1267 Note: RETAIL_PRICE_AT denotes the after-tax retail fuel prices, RETAIL_MARK_UP_PT is the retail mark-up in the pre-tax fuel prices, RETAIL_MARK_UP_AT is the retail mark-up in the after-tax fuel price. Values are based on prices per litre. 
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